Congressional Intent and the ERA: A Proposed New Analysis by Dillon, David Reid
Comment
Congressional Intent and the
ERA: A Proposed New Analysis
The proposed equal rights amendment [ERA]' to the United States
Constitution, passed by the House of Representatives October 12, 1971,2
and by the Senate March 22, 1972, 3 remains today a matter of unique legal
controversy. Although the original seven year period allowed by Congress
for ratification expired March 22, 1979, an extension of time voted by
Congress last year allows ratification of the proposed amendment until
June 30, 1982.4 The extension, if constitutionally valid, gives a new life to
the once moribund ERA.6
This Comment will examine the effects of ERA ratification by an
investigation of congressional intent behind the enactment of the ERA.
Further exploration will be made of the exceptions Congress proposed to
the general principle of the ERA, and a new schema is proposed for the
adjudication of future ERA cases that vitiates some of the difficulties
involved in the congressional schema. The proposed schema, though
differing in analysis from the one of Congress, produces similar results to
that of Congress and arguably has a more explicit textual basis in the ERA.
I. SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS PRIOR TO THE ERA
Constitutional attack on sex-based classifications at present must
generally be based upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.7 Equal protection analysis considers the nature of the
classification dealt with by some state action, the nature of the individual
interest affected by that action, and the nature of the governmental interest
furthered by that action.8
1. The text of the proposed equal rights amendment is as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied orabridged by the United
States or any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
2. 117 CONG. REc. 35815 (1971).
3. 118 CONG. REc. 9598 (1972).
4. See New York Times, November 6, 1978, at 51, col. 5.
5. The constitutionality of the extension has been questioned. Almond, Can .R.A. Be Saved?,
64 AM. B.AJ. 1504 (1978). Under present case law, however, it appears that the propriety of the
extension is a political question not subject to review in the courts. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939).
6. At the time of publication of this Comment, 35 of the 38 States required for mtification had
approved the ERA.
7. See generally L. TalIE, AMERICAN CONsrrrTUTIONAL LAw 1063-74 (1978).
8. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
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At the time of the House ratification of the ERA, no Supreme Court
decision had ever held that a classification based upon sex was
unconstitutional. 9 The reason for this failure was that sex-based
classifications were originally judged under the rational basis standard.10
Under this standard, "[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.""
After the House ratification and before the Senate debates began, the
Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed 12 struck down an Idaho law giving men
preference over women for appointment as administrator of a decedent
relative's estate. Although the decision purported to apply the rational
basis standard,13 the Court appeared to be adopting sub rosa a more
stringent test for sex-based classifications.'
4
In its next pronouncement on sex-based classifications, Frontiero v.
Richardson, 5 a plurality of the Court held that classifications based upon
sex were suspect. Thus, the Court required the state to show that a
compelling interest was served by the statute and that no less restrictive
means of achieving that interest existed for the classification to pass
constitutional muster.' 6 Such a standard of scrutiny is tantamount to per
se unconstitutionality.'
7
The Court, however, retreated from this position, declining to hold
sex-based classifications suspect in several cases following Frontiero.t8 To
add to the uncertainty, in Kahn v. Shevin,19 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Florida statute granting property tax exemptions
only to widows, apparently using a test akin to the traditional rational
basis test.20 An emerging two-tiered standard appeared to be implicit in the
9. E.g., 117 CONG. REc. 35306 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
10. For a garish demonstration of this standard's application to a sex-based classification, see
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
11. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
12. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The case was decided November 22, 1971.
13. Id. at 76: "The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state
objective .. "
14. See Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 163, 172-73.
15. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,11
(1967).
17. The only case employing a strict scrutiny standard in which the classification was upheld was
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
19. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
20. Id. at 355: "A state tax law is not arbitrary although it'discriminate[s] in favor of a certain
class . . . if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy,'
not in conflict with the Federal Constitution." (brackets and ellipsis in original; capitalization as In
original) (citing Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959), which applied the traditional
rational basis test).
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Court's decisions: a more stringent standard for classifications that
disfavored women, a test less stringent than the strict scrutiny standard of
Frontiero but less deferential than the rational basis test, and at the same
time the traditional deferential rational basis test for classifications that
21favored women.
The validity of this analysis was undermined by the Court's decision in
Craig v. Boren,22 which struck down differential treatment of males and
females with respect to the age at which 3.2% beer could be purchased. The
statute struck down disfavored males, by requiring them to be three years
older than females to buy beer.23
The doubts raised by Craig concerning the two-tiered analysis were
justified in the Court's holding in Orr v. Orr,24 which struck down an
Alabama statute that allowed women, but not men, to receive alimony.
Although the Court's opinion acknowledged that reduction of the
economic disparity caused by discrimination against women was an
important governmental objective,25 it held that the sex-based classifica-
tion employed was gratuitous.26 While the statute might be justified as
providing help for the needy spouse,27 the Court stated that the use of sex
was unnecessary for two reasons: (1) individualized hearings of the parties'
relative economic circumstances were already being held, 28 and (2) the
statute benefited only financially independent wives with needy
husbands.29
It is difficult to tell the ultimate effect of the Court's decision in Orr,
but, as will be seen, the result in that case is thoroughly consistent with the
goals of the ERA. Orr may mark the end of an era in which sex-based
classifications were judged largely upon whether they were perceived by
the Court as favoring women; instead thejudicatory touchstone may now
be whether the sex-based classification is relevant to the purpose of the
statute.
II. ERA-THE BASIC PRINCIPLE
A. Congressional Intent-Its Role
in the Adjudication of the ERA
It is assumed throughout this Comment that congressional intent will
be accorded great weight by the United States Supreme Court in its future
21. See Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DuKE
Li. 163, 179-81.
22. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
23. Id. at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
24. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
25. Id. at 1112.
26. Id. at 1113.
27. Id. at 1112.
28. Id. at 1113.
29. Id.
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interpretation of the ERA. Proponents30 and opponents3' of the ERA
expressed differing views of the role of congressional intent in con-
stitutional adjudication and the issue is not altogether free from doubt.
For example, in the House hearings on the ERA, then-Assistant
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist disparaged the role of
congressional legislative history in constitutional adjudication:
Logically, it would appear that legislative history would not be particularly
persuasive unless it could be shown that not only the Congress, but the
ratifying legislatures of three-quarters of the States were fully aware of an
ambiguity in the language of the amendment, and of the legislative reports of
debates which purported to clarify that ambiguity.
32
Such an objection should not defeat the role of Congress in the
interpretation of the ERA for two reasons. The first is that, despite dicta in
Maxwell v. Dow (one of the few United States Supreme Court cases to
address the issue squarely) to the contrary,33 the Supreme Court has
traditionally placed great weight upon the intent of Congress in
constitutional adjudication.34 Indeed, this must be the case, unless one
posits an unbridled discretion upon the part of the Supreme Court,35 for it
must be assumed that a constitutional amendment is passed for some
reason and some effect is intended. The natural source for elucidation of
that intent is Congress, since, in contrast to Congress, the states typically
keep no legislative history from which intent can be deduced.36 One might
hypothesize an amendment ratified by the states with a different intent
than that of Congress, but a mere hypothesis should not prevent the courts
from receiving illumination from the one source unquestionably available
to them.37
30. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9336 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Gurney): "[iThe intention of
Congress is crucial to any understanding of how it will be implemented."
31. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9342 (1972) (remarks of Sen. FonO: "All the expectations, the
hopes, the anticipations, and, I fear, the speeches ofthe proponents ofthis legislation will not cause the
courts to alter the language of the proposed amendment. .. ."
32. Equal Rights for Men and Women 1971: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 35,208, and Related Bills,
and H.R. 916 and Related Bills Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
33. 176 U.S. 581, 601-02 (1900). Cf. with note 22 supra.
34. See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), which pays at least lip
service to the intent of Congress in passing the post-Civil War constitutional amendments. See also R,
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 617-41, 653-55 (1976), and Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1955), for discussions of the role played by congressional
history and intent in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. For an argument against such unbridled discretion, see generally R. BURoa, GOVERNMUINT
BY JUDICIARY (1977). Unlike Berger, however, this Comment does not argue against an evolutionary
interpretation of constitutional amendments beyond the original intent of their framers,
36. Eg., J. JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 203 (Successor Vol,
to POLLACK'S FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH, 4th ed. 1977): "Generally, state legislatures do not
publish their debates, committee reports, or transcripts of hearings held before legislative committees.
It is not, therefore, possible to compile a legislative history for a state law as .. . for federal laws."
37. Cf., e.g.:
[l]t is not unrealistic . . . to assume notice of congressional purpose in the state
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The second reason is that, even if the objection raised by then-
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist were generally valid, a showing
could be made that, in the case of the ERA, the states were in fact aware of
ambiguities in the amendment and the clarifications of those ambiguities in
the debates and reports. The struggles of women's groups and ERA
proponents and the measure's final triumph in Congress were the subject of
widespread national publicity.38 In addition, commentators since the
congressional passage of the ERA have adopted either the congressional
view or the almost identical view espoused by an influential Yale Law
Journal article 9 on the subject in discussing the measure.40 The
implication is clear that the ratifying states knew the congressional
solution to the ambiguities of the ERA4' and approved that solution. To
believe otherwise is to attempt to replace the widely circulated, extensively
legislatures. A showing of ratification on the basis of an understanding different from that
revealed by congressional materials must carry the burden of proof. And, of course, the
ratifying states are a chorus of voices; a discordant one among them proves little.
Bickel, supra note 34, at 7.
38. The New York Times, for example, ran 16 news stories relating to the passage of the ERA by
Congress from March 25, 1971, when House subcommittee hearings began, to March 24, 1972,
immediately following final passage of the measure. The skeptical should see generally TIHE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT PROJECT, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT. A BIBLIOGRAP1I1CAL STUDY (1976).
39. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment:A Constitutional Basis
for Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE LU. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as YALE LAW JOURNAL].
40. Commentators adopting thoseviews include: A. BINGAMAN, A COMMENTARYONTIHE EFFECT
OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT ON STATE LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 18-21 (1975) (relying on YALE
LAW JOURNAL, supra note 39); B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATz,& A. PRICE, WOMENs RIGiTS AND
THE LAW. THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON STATE LAWS 13-19 (1977) (relying on congressional history); S.
Ross, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A WOMAN'S RIGirrs20-21 (1973); The Equal
Rights Amendment, HUMAN RIGHTS 54 (July 1971) (symposium citing Rita E. Hauser, a proponent of
the ERA); Ferrell, The Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution-Areas of
Controversy, 6 URB. LAW. 853, 863 (1974) (relying upon legislative history); Comment, The Impact of
the Equal Rights Amendment on the New York State Alimony Statute, 24 BUFF. L REy. 395 (1975);
Comment, The Equal Rights Amendment: Constraint on Discretion in Family Law, 22 BUFF. L REv.
917, 918 (1973) ("consistent with legislative history and intent of the amendment"); AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, AGAINST AN UNQUALIFIED EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1950).
Other commentators, without specifying what standard of review to be employed, rely upon legislative
history. L. FORD, 5 WOMEN'S LEGAL HANDBOOK ON JOB AND SEX DISCRIMINATION I passlin (1974)
(extensive quotations from legislative history); REPORT ON NATIONAL COMMISSION ONTHE OBSERVANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR, To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION 27-30 (1976) (indicates
legislative history will be important); B. BOYLAN, THE LEGAL RIGrTs OF WOMEN 121-50 (1971)
(contains legislative history, arguments pro and con ERA, and testimony ofsponsor, Congresswoman
Martha W. Griffith in the House hearings); K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE 261-89 (1974) (extensive
quotations from legislative history and YALE LAW JOURNAL, supra note 39). Other commentators,
relying upon legislative history, list a different, vaguely defined standard, e.g., Tie COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, ALL ARE CREATED EQUAL 2 (1972) (cites to legislative history to prove equality
"unqualified"). Others list no authority and cite no standard but appear to believe the approach is
correct, e.g., W. BROWN, A. RUZICHO, & S. EISENMAN, STUDY OF TilE 01110 REVISED CODE PRESENTEID
TO THE TASK FORCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EQUAL RIGIITS AMENDMENT (1974). Others cite
the approach as one of two possible alternatives, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, LAW AND TilE STATUS OF VoMEN 313 (1977) (stating that
other possibility is to shift the burden of proof as to constitutionality of statute to the state). The only
commentators contra this approach suggest the ERA will makesex a suspect classification. Comment,
The Equal Rights Amendment: Its Meaning and Its Impact on Missouri Law, 39 U. Mo. L REv. 553,
554 (1974) (citing, inter alia, YALE LAW JOURNAL, supra note 39); Note, Equalityfor Men and Women,
Three Approaches: Frontiero, The Equal Rights Amendment, and the Montana Equal Dignities
Provision, 35 MONT. L. REV. 325, 331 (1974) (citing no authority).
41. For the ambiguities in ERA, see infra section IV.
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
documented intention of Congress with a merely hypothetical and
* inaccessible contrary intention of the state legislatures ratifying the ERA.
B. A New Constitutional Standard
It is an elementary canon of statutory construction that knowledge of
the mischief to be remedied or the cause or necessity of a law is an
important extrinsic aid in the discovery of the meaning of a legislative
42provision. Congress thoroughly documented the reason for the necessity
of the ERA during the debates, and that reason was discrimination against
women.
43
Discrimination against women was found in many fields and in many
forms. It occurred in education," in labor and employment,45 in the
criminal law,46 in the federal government,47 as well as in other contexts.48 A
few discriminations were also found against men,49 but the basic purpose
of the ERA is to eliminate discrimination against women.
50
It does not follow, however, that because the proposed amendment
was ratified by Congress to combat sex discrimination, much as the
fourteenth amendment was ratified to combat racial discrimination, the
ERA therefore makes sex a suspect classification in equal protection
terms. Although some proponents maintained that sex discrimination was
already unconstitutional under the equal protection clause5' and several
42. F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 33 (1953).
43. Eg., SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, EQUAL RIGHTS lOR MEN AND WOMEN, S. Doc.
No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, H. R. Doc. No. 359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, 5-8
(197!) (separate views of Rep. Edwards and others). (Because the views of Rep. Edwards favored the
unamended version of ERA that was eventually ratified by both houses of Congress, those views
represent more closely those of the legislative intent of the House. For that reason, the separate views of
Rep. Edwards will be cited hereinafter as HOUSE REPORT.)
44. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 8; HOUSE REPORTosupra note43, at5; 118 CoN,
REC. 8901 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
45. E.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9555 (1972) (remarks of Sen. R. Byrd); id. at 9553 (remarks of Sen.
Moss); id. at 9551 (remarks of Sen. Hartke); id. at 9548 (remarks of Sen. Tower); Id. at 9544 (remarks of
Sen. Miller); id. at 8894 (remarks of Sen. Mondale); 117 CONG. REC. 35804 (1971) (remarks of Rep.
Badillo); id. at 35799 (remarks of Rep. Brasco).
46. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 7; 118 CONG. REC. 9596 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Percy); id. at 9552 (remarks of Sen. Symington); id. at 9544 (remarks of Sen. Chiles); Id. at 9335
(remarks of Sen. Gurney), id. at 8906 (remarks of Sen. Cook); id. at 8901 (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Id. at
8894 (remarks of Sen. Mondale); 117 CONG. REC. 35806 (197 1) (remark, ofRep. Broyhill); /d. at 35789
(remarks of Rep. Abzug).
47. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9551 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Hartke) (social security and other
benefits giving greater benefit to one sex than the other); id. at 9552 (remarks of Sen. Symington)
(limitations on entry of women into military service).
48. E.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9595 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Percy) (inequalities in marriage and
divorce laws); 117 CoNG. REC. 35318 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Ryan) (different ages of majority); 118
CONG. REC. 8901 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (greater percentage of female juveniles punished for
acts that would have been non-criminal if they had been committed by adults); SENATE REOwRT,3supra
note 43, at 8 (restrictions on the ability of married women to contract).
49. See 118 CONG. REC. 8905 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Cook) (citing failure to give husband
dower or curtesy rights, failure of social security to give husband surtivorship benefits, and giving
automatic preference to the female in child custody actions).
50. See 117 CONG. REC. 35791 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Ryan).
51. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9550 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
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described effects consistent with making sex a suspect category, " none of
the leading proponents so described the ERA's effects in that way. In fact,
the leading House opponent of the ERA suggested that sex should be a
suspect category.
53
Rather, something more than that was intended. As the Senate ERA
floor manager said: "If the Supreme Court were to hold that discrimina-
tion based on sex, like discrimination based on race, is inherently'suspect'
and cannot be justified in the absence of a'compelling and overriding state
interest,' then part of the reason for the amendment would disappear."54
What was needed was a "new constitutional yardstick" 55 -a standard
that would avoid the complexities of fourteenth amendment analysis-to
measure discrimination on the basis of sex. For this reason, almost all of
the precedents dealing with sex-based classifications under the fourteenth
amendment would be inapplicable.56
What Congress intended the ERA to do was something more than the
fourteenth amendment would do:17 prohibit all distinctions between men
and women except within very circumscribed areas of exception.58 The
basic principle was succinctly stated by Senator Birch Bayh at the
beginning of the Senate debates:
The goal [of the ERA] ... is to insure that the Federal Government, the
State governments, and local governments treat each person, male, and
female, on the basis of his or her own individual abilities and
characteristics . . . .The principle on which the amendment is based is one
on which we should all be able to agree: a person's sex should not be a factor
in determining one's rights under the law.59
Bayh's view of the ERA was shared by other Senate proponents. Sex
is an "irrelevant basis" for classification, 60 and under the ERA it would no
52. E.g., 117 CONG. REc. 35325 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Reid) (the ERA would shift burden of
proof to federal or state governments to justify disparate treatment).
53. See 117 CONG. REc. 35299 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins): "[A]ny difference having a
partial basis in sex should be suspect, but not automatically invalidated:' See also House REPORT,
supra note 43, at4 (majority views): "[A]ny State or Federal statute classifying by sex would likewise be
subject to a strict standard of scrutiny .. " Cf. notes 15, 16 and accompanying text supra.
54. 118 CONG. REC. 8901 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 8906 (remarks of Sen. Cook).
56. The one exception noted by proponents would be in the area of state action. See House
REPORT, supra note 43, at 7. The passage cited therein refers to "some of its other features" as being
textually similar to the fourteenth amendment and hence could be interpreted inparniatera with that
amendment. These textual similarities are not specified, but at least one othersimilarity has been noted.
The enforcement clauses of the ERA and the fourteenth amendment are identical. See SE'€ATE REPORT,
supra note 43, at 20. This would seem to make fourteenth amendment precedent dealing with the
enforcement clause applicable. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
57. See 117 CONG. REc. 35787 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt): "[T]he effect of the equal
protection clause is to prohibit"prejudicial disparities' in the law. . . .This constitutional amendment
does more than that. It says we may not take into account, standing alone, the question of sex in
determining the rights of men and women."
58. For the areas of exception, see Section III infra.
59. 118 CONG. REc. 8900 (1972) (remarks ofSen. Bayh) (except for ellipses, all capitalization and
punctuation as in original). Accord, SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
60. 118 CONG. REC. 9526 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). See also id. at 9336 (remarks of Sen.
Gurney).
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longer be an "allowable determinant of legal rights."61 This prohibition "is
more than a mere negative statement that henceforth there can be no
legally sanctioned discrimination against women ... . It means that
governments "must set up reasonable distinctions and qualifications based
not on the over-broad categorization of sex, but rather on the
characteristics of individuals."
63
This broad and absolute prohibition against sex as a classification
basis was also understood by Senate opponents as the effect of the ERA.
Despite their criticisms of the prohibition as unrealistic, 64 unnatural,63 and
overly rigid, 6 and their assertion that this prohibition would strike down
laws favorable to women,67 Senate supporters of the ERA did not soften
their stance. Rather, they readily conceded that such a broad-based
prohibition of sexual classifications would flow from the text of the ERA.
One colloquy between Senator Ervin, the leading Senate opponent of
the ERA, and Senator Bayh, the chief ERA spokesman, is particularly
illuminating. Ervin charged that the ERA could be interepreted to mean
that it "converts men and women into identical legal beings and confers
upon men and women identical legdl rights and subjects men and women
to identical legal responsibilities, ' 6 and that such an interpretation would
necessarily be imposed upon it by the Supreme Court, because the
amendment "is absolute and rigid in terms."'6 9
Bayh replied:
[Senator Ervin] went further to say that what we were trying to create
were identical legal rights. I agree 100 per cent with [him] on that point ....
Identical legal rights, based on the God-given talents and skills that one
human being possesses? Indeed, that is the very thing we are trying to protect
and to insure.70
Additional evidence for the Senate's view may be found in its refusal
to allow amendments that would qualify its prohibitions against sexual
classifications. The Senate repeatedly rejected by wide margins qualifying
amendments offered by Senator Ervin, including, inter alia, amendments
allowing laws exempting women from compulsory military laws,
71
61. 118 CONG. REC. 9550 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Fulbright). See also Id. at 9555 (rcmnrks of
Sen. Byrd).
62. Id. at 9547 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 9319 (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 9371 (remarks of Sen. Hansen).
67. Id. at 9544 (remarks of Sen. Buckley); id. at 9351 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); Id. at 9087
(remarks of Sen. Long).
68. Id. at 9566 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 9575 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). HousE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6-7.
71. For the text of the proposed amendment, see 118 CONG. REC, 9317 (1972). The amendment
was defeated 18-73. Id. at 9336-37.
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allowing exemption of women from military combat, 72 allowing laws
protective of women,7 3 allowing laws imposing responsibility for child
support upon fathers,74 and a substitute equal rights amendment allowing
distinctions between the sexes on the basis of physiological and functional
differences.75
The same nearly-absolute prohibition of sex-based classifications was
intended by the House of Representatives. The minority committee report
of Representative Don Edwards and thirteen others stated:
The [ERA] ...embodies a moral value judgment that a legal right or
obligation should not depend upon sex, but other factors-factors which are
common to both sexes. This judgment is rooted in the basic concern of
society . . with the right of the individual to develop his own potentiali-
ty.
76
The minority report was supported by the House majority that
ratified the ERA unamended, as proposed by Representative Edwards,
and is thoroughly consistent with the consensus in the Senate. One
proponent said: "The basic principle underlying [ERA] is that legal rights
must be determined by the actual attributes of an individual, not by sex."7
What the ERA meant to its proponents, therefore, "is very simple: sex
should not be a factor in determining the legal rights of men or women."
7
'
Differentiation on the basis of sex is therefore "totally precluded regardless
of whether a legislature or a court considers such a classification to be
'reasonable,' 'healthy,' or beneficial to society as a whole. 79 Once again, as
in the Senate, the goal of merely prohibiting sex-based discrimination was
rejected in favor of ensuring full equality.80
72. For the text of the proposed amendment, see 118 CoNG. REc. 9337 (1972). The amendment
was defeated 18-71. Id. at 9351.
73. For the texts of the proposed amendments, see 118 CoNG. REc. 9351 (1972) and 118 CoNG.
REc. 9517 (1972). The amendments were defeated by votes of 11-75 and 14-77 respectively. Id. at 9370.
9523.
74. For the text of the proposed amendment, see 118 CONG. Rc. 9524 (1972). The amendment
was defeated 17-72. Id. at 9528.
75. For the text, see 118 CONG. REc. 9537 (1972). The amendment was defeated 12-78. Id. at
9538. Senator Ervin also offered a substitute amendment which would have submitted both the ERA
and a proposed alternate constitutional amendment to the states for ratification. The proposed
alternate amendment contained, inter alia, all the above-enumerated proposed Senate amendments to
the ERA. For the text of the proposed alternative amendment, see 118 CoNG. REc. 9538 (1972). That
amendment, predictably, was defeated 9-82. Id. at 9540.
76. HousE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6-7.
77. 117 CONG. REc. 35791 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Ryan).
78. Id. at 35796 (remarks of Rep. O'Neill).
79. Id. at 35809 (remarks of Rep. Ashley).
80. See, e.g., id. at 35789-90:
Rep. Hanna: Mhegentleman was trying to make clear that there is a difference, in fact, a
very big distinction between pursuing the question as to whether someone has been
discriminated against on the one side, and as to whether that person has a position ofequality
on the other.
Rep. Eckhardt: Exactly....
Rep. Hanna: But it seems to me that this leads to the second point that I thought the
ERA
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Opponents of the ERA in the House raised virtually the same
arguments against the broad scope of the ERA as did Senate opponents:
the ERA would void legitimate legal differences between the sexes;8' the
prohibitions of the ERA should be narrowed;82 the ERA violated com-
mon sense;83 and the ERA would eliminate laws favoring women.84 In
the House as in the Senate, ERA proponents did not retreat from the
viewpoint that the ERA would, in general, void all legal distinctions
between men and women.85 In the House as in the Senate, ERA
proponents rejected the alternative of qualifying the broad prohibitions of
the ERA, defeating by a vote of 87-26516 an amendment suggested by the
majority of the Judiciary Committee that would allow exemption of
women from the military draft and preserve some sexual distinctions.
C. Rationale for the Congressional View
The interpretation placed upon the language of the ERA by its
partisans does not ineluctably follow from its text, but it is a plausible
interpretation and, indeed, probably the most plausible.8 8 Furthermore,
aside from any textual reading, three factors coalesced to compel the
reading placed upon the ERA by Congress as the most effective way to
combat sexual discrimination.
The first factor is that historically the discriminatory legislation that
prompted the ERA had been justified as favoring or protecting women.89
Foremost among such laws were the "protective" labor laws, condemned
by ERA proponents in Congress and by members of the public at the ERA
hearings as discriminatory.90 Since oppressive groups throughout history
gentlemen was trying to make, and that is ... that there are laws which address themselves
to conditions in society that may involve either men or women that with the passage of [the
ERA]those laws will be predicated upon facts other than sex, Isic] which support the
rationale for such laws.
Rep. Eckhardt: That is exactly correct.
81. Id. at 35807 (remarks of Rep. Sullivan).
82. Id. at 35785 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
83. Id. at 35784 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins).
84. Id. at 35788 (remarks of Rep. Abernethy).
85. E.g., id. at 35808-9 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier): "Equality with qualification is a sham, It
makes a mockery of the basic principle which this body is mandated to uphold. Nothing short of total
equality of rights for all individuals-one system of equality for all-is acceptable."
86. 117 CONG. REC. 35813 (1971).
87. The text of the proposed amendment, known as the Wiggins Amendment, was as follows:
Sec. 2. This article shall not impair the validity of any law of the United States which exempts
a person from compulsory military service or any other law of the United States or of any
State which reasonably promotes the health and safety of the people.
117 CONG. REC. 35784 (1971).
88. Cf., e.g.: "Frankly, I do not see how the Supreme Court can do otherwise [than hold that the
ERA prohibits all legal distinctions between men and women]. The [ERA] contains no exceptions or
limitations and applies in absolute terms to every situation falling within its scope," 118 CoNG, RiiC,
9086 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
89. Cf., e.g., I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *445: "[E]ven the disabilities which the wife lies
under are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit: so great a favorite is the female sex
of the laws of England."
90. For Congressional reaction, see, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 9; HousH RE'ORT,
supra note 43, at 6; 118 CONG. REC. 9596 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 9596 (remarks of
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have rationalized their actions as protective,9' and since the state might
seek to justify new discriminatory legislation by calling it favorable to
women,92 Congress believed that the safest alternative would be to abolish
completely virtually all distinctions between the sexes.
The second reason for adopting a broad-based prohibition was its
simplicity. Because ERA proponents believed the courts had failed to meet
their responsibilities in the field of sex discrimination,93 they were chary
about entrusting the Supreme Court with an amendment that allowed a
wide scope for decisionmaking.94 Rather than soften the impact of the
ERA by qualification, they preferred to cut the Gordian knot with an
almost absolute prohibition of distinctions between the sexes.
95
The third reason for adopting such a broad-based prohibition was
that any distinctions between men and women (other than the few
exceptions recognized by Congress96) would in themselves support the
rationale of sex discrimination: that men and women are separate classes,
with women unable to shoulder responsibilities and therefore in need of
protection. This rationale was emphatically rejected. Laws that seek to
"'protect" women were viewed as paternalistic.98 In short, laws that make
such invalid distinctions between the sexes are discriminatory, whether
they exclude women from certain rights or responsibilities, confer special
benefits, or create a separate legal status for women without assigning
them to a higher or lower rank.99
Because conferring a special status upon either sex was perceived as
fostering the subordination of women, it follows both theoretically and
practically that the ERA mandates equality of responsibilities as well as
Sen. Percy); id. at 9553 (remarks of Sen. Moss); id. at 9552 (remarks of Sen. Symington); id. at 9549
(remarks of Sen. Sparkman); id. at 9547 (remarks of Sen. Brooke); id. at 9544 (remarks ofSen. Chiles);
id. at 9372 (remarks ofSen. Kennedy); id. at9321 (remarks ofScn. Bayh); 117 Co G. REC. 35809(1971)
(remarks of Rep. Stokes); id. at 35806 (remarks of Rep. Broyhill); id. at 35799 (remarks of Rep.
Ashley); id. at 35799 (remarks of Rep. Brasco); id. at 35798 (remarks of Rep. Fraser); id. at 35797
(remarks of Rep. Drinan); id. at 35796 (remarks of Rep. O'Neill); id. at 35788 (remarks ofRcp.Abzug);
id. at35325 (remarks ofRep. Scheuer); id. at35324 (remarks of Rep. Roy); id. at35306,35785 (remarks
of Rep. Edwards).
For statements made by ERA supporters at the hearings on the amendment, see 77te "Equal
Rights" Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-13, 392-411, 575-77 (1970).
91. HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 5.
92. 118 CONG. REC. 9537 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
93. See, e.g., 117 CONG. Rc. 35802 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Danielson).
94. Cf., e.g., the testimony of the sponsor of ERA during the House hearings: "I think that [the
ERA would permit some distinctions to be made between men and women] but I do hope that you
people quit talking about them because the thing I want the court to be told is to stop making every
distinction." House Hearings, supra note 32, at 51 (statement of Rep. Martha Griffiths).
95. Cf. 117 CONG. Rac. 35794 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Conable): "Rather than slicing the
Gordian knot that courts have tied by theirjudicial distinctions between the legal status ofmale persons
and female persons, the crippled amendment presented by the committee [the Wiggins Amendment]
adds only a few more strands to the knot." See note 87 supra for the text of the Wiggins Amendment.
96. For those exceptions, see Section III infra.
97. Cf., e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 35801 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell).
98. Id. at 35809 (remarks of Rep. Stokes).
99. Id. at 35319 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer).
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equality of rights. The right of women "is no less than the right to be taken
seriously as a citizen who shares equally with men all civic responsibilities
and enjoys the full complement of privileges associated with
citizenship."' 00 This yoking of rights and responsibilities occurred
continually during the debates' 1 and is consistent with the policy aims
discussed above.
D. The Role of Affirmative Action
Although it appears that Congress intended that prior anti-
discrimination statutes would be unimpaired by the ERA, °2 it would
appear that compensatory aid to women would be precluded if the ERA is
ratified. Congressional comment is less than full on this point. It was
stressed again and again that quotas would not be required under the
ERA; 0 3 the issue whether quotas would be allowed was rarely
discussed. 0 4 The entire rationale supporting the ERA, however, is against
such compensatory devices. Such devices would have many of the flaws
associated with the "protective" laws condemned by the ERA: they would
make distinctions between men and women on the basis of sex, without
taking the individual's ability to perform into account.105 They would
create a special legal status for women, thus reinforcing sex discrimina-
tion; 0 6 and would allow sex-based distinctions that could justify
discriminatory legislation in the future107
The dividing line between permissible and impermissible devices
should be whether the compensatory device classifies on the basis of sex.
Statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963108 do not classify
on that basis; instead, they classify on the basis of discriminatory and
nondiscriminatory conduct. They require only that organizations not
100. Id. at 35311 (remarks of Rep. Abzug).
101. 118 CONG. REc. 9552 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Symington); id. at 9550 (remarks of Sen,
Gambrell); id. at 9335 (rimarks of Sen. Bayh); Id. at 9334 (remarks of Sen. Percy); 117 CoNa. Rie,
35810 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Broomfield); id. at 35809 (remarks of Rep. Stokes); W. at 35808
(remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 35798 (remarks of Rep. Fraser); Id. at 35795 (remarks of Rep,
Heckler); id. at 35786 (remarks of Rep. Gude); id. at 35311, 35313 (remarks of Rep. Abzug); Id. at
35302 (remarks of Rep. Albert). Contra: "[The ERA] ...does not say that all shall have the same
duties." Id. at 35804 (remarks of Rep. Pepper).
102. E.g., 118 CONG. Rc. 8903 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh), discussing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1976).
103. SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 2, 11; 118 CONG. REc. 9596 (1972) (remarks of Sen,
Percy); id. at 9554 (remarks of Sen. Moss); id. at9336 (remarks of Sen. Gurney); id. at 8902 (remarks of
Sen. Bayh).
104. The only direct reference found in the debates was: "The legal doctrines of'separate but
equal' and of 'benign quota' and 'compensatory aid' have not [aided? word apparently omitted]
constitutional nor beneficial relations between the races. These theories will not provide for justice
between the sexes either." 117 CONG. REc. 35317 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Thone),
105. Cf., e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.
106. See note 99 supra.
107. See note 92 supra.
108. See note 102 supra.
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disregard the attributes of individuals because of an overbroad
classificatory scheme. By this requirement these statutes further the goals
of the ERA.'0 9
An example of what this Comment maintains to be an impermissible
compensatory device under the ERA was upheld by the Washington
Supreme Court in Marchioro v. Chaney.'" That court, interpreting a state
equal rights provision virtually identical to the ERA,"' upheld two state
laws requiring certain political posts to be fifty percent male and fifty
percent female. "2 The majority held that the statutes made equality actual
as well as theoretical and were constitutionally permissible.3 If one
assumes that the state provision is to be construed in pari materia with the
ERA," 4 such an interpretation is clearly wrong.
As the Marchioro dissent pointed out, such statutes could work
discrimination against women if the two best qualified persons for the
paired posts were women; despite the superior individual qualifications of
the second woman, a man would have to be chosen for the second post. t" 5
Thus, a showing of discrimination against either sex should not be
required; the policy goals of the ERA require the fusion of the legal roles of
men and women, not their balkanization. To mandate the numerical
equality of men and women, however laudable it may seem as a
compensatory aid for women, can in the long run only reinforce the idea
that men and women are fundamentally "different" from each other in
legally cognizable ways-a view entirely contradictory to the avowed goals
of ERA proponents.
III. THE INTENT OF CONGRESS-A TRINITY OF EXCEPTIONS
The sweeping prohibition of sex-based classifications by the ERA is
not without its exceptions, if congressional intent is accepted as the
standard of interpretation for the proposed amendment. Repeatedly, the
proponents of the ERA, though not denying its sweeping prohibition of
sex-based classifications, claimed these exceptions would survive that
sweeping prohibition. These exceptions were discussed under the rubrics
109. Cf. SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 1I: "[The ERA] simply prohibits discrimination on
the basis of a person's sex."
110. 582 P.2d 487 (Wash. 1978).
111. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI: "Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be
denied or abridged on account of sex." Cf. note I supra.
112. The statutes in question were WASH. REv. CODE §§ 29.42.020 and 29A2.030 (1974), which
respectively required the two members of the Washington State Democratic Committee elected by
county chairmen, and the chairman and vice-chairman of the committee, to be of opposite sexes.
113. 582 P.2d at493.
114. The majority itself so assumed, citing authorities dealing with the ERA to support its
holding. 582 P.2d at 491 and authorities cited therein.
115. 582 P.2d at 497 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
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of "the right of privacy,' '16 "unique physical characteristics,"''1 7 and "the
power of the state to regulate cohabitation and sexual activity by
unmarried persons.""' 8
The first exception, the right of privacy, 1 9 was explained in the
debates as allowing the state to continue sexual segregation of restrooms,
prison facilities, mental institutions, and other traditionally sexually
segregated governmental facilities. 2
0
The second exception, unique physical characteristics (that is,
physical characteristics unique to one sex), was used to justify the
imposition of criminal liabilities to certain sexual behavior, 2' and to allow
regulation of physical attributes found only in one sex,1
22
The third exception, the right to regulate cohabitation and sexual
activity of unmarried persons, was rarely mentioned and lightly treated
during the congressional debates.2 3 It was used to justify the segregation
of male and female prisoners in prison facilities 24 and presumably it would
operate to allow the state to forbid fornication and cohabitation by
unmarried persons.
Although commentators have tended to follow the congressional
taxonomy,125 it appears that the effects of the ERA as envisioned by
Congress cannot be subsumed under these general headings. In particular,
both the right of privacy and the right of the state to regulate cohabitation
and sexual activity by unmarried persons present analytical problems, and
some of the ascribed effects of the unique physical characteristics
exception are difficult to justify under any principled analysis.
Two assumptions must be made for the purpose of this analysis: (1)
but for the exceptions enumerated, the ERA would forbid any sex-based
classification by the state, and (2) in order to escape from the otherwise
rigid prohibition of sex-based classifications, the exceptions must be
116. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 2; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 7; 118 CONO,
REC. 9548 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson); id. at 9531 (remarks of Sen. Cook); id. at 9336 (remarks
of Sen. Gurney); 117 CONG. REC. 35809 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Ashley); id. at 35801 (remarks of Rep.
Mitchell); id. at 35797 (remarks of Rep. Drinan); id. at 35791 (remarks of Rep. Ryan); /d. at 35312
(remarks of Rep. Abzug).
117. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 12; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 7; 118
CONG. REC. 9536 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); id. at 9336 (remarks of Sen Gurney); 117 CONG. R c.
35808 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 35797 (remarks of Rep. Drinan); Id, at 35791
(remarks of Rep. Ryan).
118. SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 12; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 7; 117 CoNG. RE ,
35307 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
119. The right of privacy, as delineated in Griswold v. Connnecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is
based upon a penumbra of the rights embodied in U.S. CONST. amends. 1, III, IV, V, and IX. The
Griswold decision was inserted into the Congressional Record by Senator Bayh. 118 CONG. REC!, 9321
(1972).
120. E.g., 118 CONG. REC. 8904, 9331 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). Contra, 117 CONG. REC. 35307
(1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
121. 118 CONG. REC. 9536 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
122. See notes 202-04 and accompanying text infra.
123. See note 118 supra.
124. 117 CONG. REC. 35307 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
125. See, e.g., YALE LAW JOURNAL, supra note 39, at 893-96, 900-02.
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shown to be implicit in the general principle of the ERA itself or shown to
be based upon an independent constitutional basis. Neither assumption
requires much discussion. The mere fact of listing these three effects as
"exceptions" shows an implied finding by Congress that, were it not for the
additional consideration involved, the sexual classification at issue would
be forbidden by the ERA. Likewise, the second assumption rests upon a
belief that congressional intent must be principled and internally
consistent as a prerequisite for its use in constitutional adjudication; in
other words, the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot create
an ad hoc exception to the general scope of an amendment by mere desire.
Given those assumptions, the right of privacy exception presents
difficulties. Although ostensibly based upon an independent constitutional
basis, the exception envisioned by Congress does not square with the right
of privacy developed in court decisions formulating that right.
The right of privacy refers to two different interests: one is the
individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters; 26 the other
is the individual's interest in independence in making certain important
decisions 27 (particularly in matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relations, and childrearing' 2 ). These matters are not
interpreted broadly; for example, private consensual homosexual
activities are not within the ambit of the right to privacy since they are not
part of marriage, home, or family life.
129
The right of privacy operates as a bar to state intervention in certain
areas of the individual's life viewed as necessary for personal autonomy.
130
It does not generally serve to extend the state's power over the individual.
Such an application, however, would be required for at least some of
the situations in which ERA proponents foresaw the operation of that
doctrine.' 3 ' Since otherwise the ERA would require sexual integration of
all state-operated facilities, the right of privacy must grant affirmative
power-to the state to counteract that mandate and allow the state to require
sexual segregation.
In some contexts, the state does have as a source of its power the
interest of individuals in being left alone.132 Therefore, the commonly cited
126. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
127. Id.
128. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
129. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975) (citing. inter
alia, Leviticus 18:22), aff'd nre., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
130. See generally Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976).
131. E.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9086, 9530 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin) (ERA would require
integration of restrooms, penal institutions, reform schools, and institutions for the mentally ill). See
also 118 CONG. REc. 9334 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin) (denying applicability of Grlsw l).
132. Case law does exist that would allow sucha holding. See, e.g., Rowanv. United States Post
Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (citizen's right "to be left alone" allows Congress to forbid
mailing of sexually provocative advertisements to individual's home upon his request); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (right allows municipal ordinance forbidding door-to-door
solicitation of magazine subscriptions); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (right allows city to
forbid use or operation of sound trucks in public streets). See also, generally, Annot., Supreme Court's
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problem of restrooms could be resolved by reference to the right of
privacy. Since a large majority of persons would favor a continuation of
single-sex restrooms, they could in effect grant the state their privacy
interests in being left alone by nonintimate persons of the opposite sex.
In other contexts, however, the analysis breaks down. Assume, for
example, that convicted criminals of both sexes prefer to have sexually
segregated prisons after passage of the ERA. There is no privacy interest to
be protected here by sexual segregation. To the extent the right of privacy
is operative in this situation, it should act in conjunction with the ERA to
mandate, and not to prohibit, sexual integration.
Three alternatives to the foregoing analysis were offered by Professor
Thomas Emerson in testimony during the House committee hearings.133
All three are questionable. The first seeks to apply the enabling clause of
the ERA to extend the right of privacy: "Under the provisions authorizing
Congress to implement the amendment, I would think that Congress could
spell out or an appropriate State legislature, under virtue of its general
authority, could spell out in detail, in some detail, what it would require in
order to enforce the right of privacy."1 34 The right of privacy is not
mentioned in the ERA as finally passed by Congress.' 35 Because it is not so
mentioned and because it is an independent constitutional power, the
enabling clause therefore would not grant Congress any special
interpretative powers regarding that doctrine. Therefore, any such
legislation spelling out the limits of the right of privacy is entitled to no
special deference and, if contrary to the provisions of the ERA, should fall.
The same would be true for state legislation because of the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution.'37
The second suggestion made by Emerson is that prisoners would be
viewed as having forfeited their rights of privacy due to their convictions of
crimes. 38 This notion has two fatal flaws' (1) it is not the right of privacy,
but rather the ERA that would compel the integration of prisons, and (2)
assuming arguendo that Emerson's suggestion is valid, it would be
applicable only to those few situations in which the participants suffer
some civil disability. One does not, for example, give up his rights by
choosing to attend college,139 and his second suggestion has no relevance
there.
Views as to the Federal Legal Aspects of the Right of Privacy, 43 L.Ed. 2d 871 (1975). Butsee Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (privacy interests of citizens not great enough to warrant conviction of
one who wears a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the draft").
133. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 402-06.
134. Id. at 403.
135. An amendment expressly exempting the right ofprivacy from the scope of the ERA offered
by Sen. Ervin was defeated 11-79. 118 CoNG. REC. 9531 (1972). For the text of the proposed
amendment, see id. at 9529.
136. The Supreme Court has found that the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment gave
Congress special powers in interpreting that amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966).
137. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI § 2.
138. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 404.
139. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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The third suggestion made by Emerson is that "the right of privacy
doesn't extend affirmatively to engage in association with otherpeople."'
40
This assertion is both dubious and irrelevant-dubious, because even
then-existing case law did not support such an assertion;1 41 and irrelevant,
because, once again, the right of privacy would not be the mandating
constitutional instrumentality; the ERA would be.
Emerson's three suggestions bespeak a confusion between the roles of
ERA and the right of privacy. Implicit in his comments was the belief that
sexual integration of government-operated facilities is an individual right
grounded in the right of privacy; instead the ERA would mandate
governmental sex-blindness in all situations where the individual right of
privacy did not give the individual (or the government acting on his behalf)
the right to be free from the effects of governmental actions in carrying out
the mandates of ERA.
A measure of the congressional uncertainty over the scope of the right
of privacy is that Representative Edwards ascribed a different scope to the
right. He did not view the right as allowing sexual segregation of
correctional facilities,1 42 although he did suggest that the "power of the
state to prohibit cohabitation by unmarried persons" would prohibit the
mixing of individuals of opposite sexes in single cells.
43
No mention, however, is ever made in the debates of the source of that
power. Arguably, this prohibition is a classification based upon sex, much
as miscegenation statutes are based upon race,1 44 and should therefore be
prohibited unless some source is indicated for that power. No suggestion
was made during the debates suggesting any rationale for the source of this
power, other than a statement that this exception, like the right of privacy,
does not violate "the principle of equality."'145
IV. THE INTENT OF CONGRESS-THE IMPLICIT SECOND STANDARD
The third exception suggested by Congress would appear to be the
most analytically sound of the three enumerated exceptions. Although the
ERA generally rejects the idea of sex-based classifications, it "does not
require that women must be treated in all respects the same as men.
Equality does not mean 'sameness.' ,,046 As a result the ERA "would not
prohibit reasonable classifications based on characteristics that are unique
140. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 404.
141. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which reversed the conviction ofa
licensed physician and the director of a Planned Parenthood League for giving information on
contraception to married couples. Since the privacy interest whichinvalidated thestatute was the right
of the married couples, it necessarily follows that the couples had a right ofassociation with those who
would provide them with information on contraception, based upon the right of privacy. See also
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
142. 117 CONG. Rac. 35307 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
143. id.
144. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
145. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 7.
146. Id.
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to one sex." 14 7 Although this rationale will be discussed again,'48 it is
reasonable to assert that a classification based upon the unique physical
characteristics of one sex does not deny equality because such a classifica-
tion is dealing with the attributes of individuals. 49 In addition, if there is a
close nexus between the unique physical characteristic and the classifica-
tion, the danger of the reemergence of legal discrimination is minimal.
The rationale for the third exception, barely articulated, arises both
from the nature of equality and an ambiguity in the text of the ERA. As the
statements dealing with the unique physical characteristics [UPC]
exception indicated, equality will allow dissimilarity of treatment when
there are actual, legally cognizable differences between classes. What
further underlines this exception is the ambiguity inhering in the word
"sex," which can mean either the state of being male or female or can mean
the complex of physiological and behavioral traits tending toward genital
union and reproduction. For purposes of this analysis the two definitions
will hereafter be termed "Sex I" and "Sex I" respectively. The purpose of
the ERA can be summarized by saying that a Sex I classification by itself is
not valid; that is, the fact of being male or female standing alone can never
justify a legal classification. UPC analysis indicates that Sex I classifi-
cations can be valid if there is in addition one other factor: a physical trait
unique to one sex.
Moreover, the examples given in the debates of unique physical
characteristics, e.g., sperm donation, 50 forcible rape laws,' 51 and
childbearing,'5 2 all have an origin in the Sex II realm: all relate to
biological adaptions for reproduction. The same may be said for all other
unique physical characteristics of each sex.
The rationale for this second standard is apparent; if we are to
regulate any gender differences, it must be on the basis of being male or
female, so that a Sex I classification is present. In this context, however, the
Sex I classification is material,'53 because of the presence of the Sex II
characteristic. Neither should such regulation be seen as a denial of
equality, because we would not be classifying on the basis of an overbroad
category. 54 Clearly, then, if a Sex II consideration is present, the rigid
prohibition against Sex I classifications is no longer applicable.
55
147. Id.
148. See Section V infra.
149. Cf., e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 35791 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Ryan): "The basic principle
underlying [the ERA] is that legal rights must be determined by the actual attributes of an individual,
not by sex." Here, however, "sex" is an actual attribute of the individual,
150. 117 CONG. REC. 35312 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Abzug).
151. 118 CONG. REC. 9536 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
152. 117 CONG. REC. 35312 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Abzug).
153. Cf., e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9550 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Gambrell): "I think the majority of
American men and women support the elimination of discrimination against women, purely on the
basis of sex, in areas where an individual's sex is immaterial."
154. Cf., e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 12: "The law may operate by grouping
individuals in terms of existing characteristics or functions, but not through a vast-overelassifieation by
sex."
155. Cf., e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9550 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Gambrell): "To me the amendment
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One caveat is in order. However analytically sound this exception is,
some of the effects ascribed to it by ERA proponents do not follow from it.
Senator Bayh, for example, suggested that laws 5Frohibiting the use of
obscene language to female telephone operators' or in the presence of
women, 57 laws forbidding seduction under the promise of marriage, 158
statutory rape laws, 59 and the Mann Act 6 would all be upheld under this
exception. A disinterested viewer, however, is unlikely to find any trait of
women or of men to uphold these statutes under any principled analysis.
Bayh was on safer (but still uncertain) ground when he asserted that
forcible rape laws would be upheld under this exception. Certainly there
would be unique physical characteristics arguably relating to this
classification, 62 and the nexus between those physical traits and the
classification is direct.
The implicit standard may also be applied to the two other exceptions.
The "right of privacy" situations spoken of by Congress typically concern
areas viewed as "sexual,"' 63 that is, the functions involved (eliminatory
functions, dressing, undressing, sleeping) are typically done in the presence
of one's.own sex or with intimates of the opposite sex. Similarly the right of
the state to regulate cohabitation and sexual activity clearly implicates Sex
II considerations. If we accept an implicit second standard for Sex II
classifications, the source of power for this exception is readily seen.
In addition, this suggested analysis would allow the state to prohibit
homosexuality 64 and homosexual marriages,/65 as suggested by Senator
Bayh. Otherwise, the only justification would be the rather weak argument
that a ban upon homosexual activities is based upon the unique physical
characteristics of men and women requiring a partner of each sex for
reproduction. In an age when contraception has severed the nexus between
sexual activity and reproduction, that argument has the ring of the child's
"because"-a "because" for no real reason.
It is important to note what this analysis does not suggest: it does not
means that legal distinctions based solely upon sex are prohibited, except in instances where sex assuch
is the matter under consideration."
156. See 118 CONG. Rac. 9536 (1972) (remarks ofSen. Bayh), replying to assertion ofSen. Ervin
that such statutes would be struck down. Id. at 9531 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
157. Id. at 9536 (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Sen. Bayh suggests that "both the group which is protected, namely, women, and the
group which can be punished, namely men, have unique physical characteristics which are directly
related to the crime, to the act for which an individual is punished (punctuation as in original)." Hedoes
not suggest whether the presence of a unique physical characteristic is required for both classes to
enable the statute to be upheld.
163. Cf., e.g., 118 CONG. REc. 9530 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin): "It isclear . .. that theonly
reason that this Nation has separate restrooms for men and women and boys and girls and separate
prisons for men and women prisoners is sex." It is not clear which definition of "sex" Ervin intended.
164. Id. at 9331 (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
165. Id.
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suggest that the ERA allows the state unlimited discretion in the area of
Sex 11.166 It does not suggest that the state may justify any legislation by an
oblique reference to a Sex II characteristic or area of activity. There must
be a reasonable relationship167 between the regulation and the Sex II trait.
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE ERA
The implicit second standard suggests a three-tiered process in the
adjudication of ERA questions. Before the analysis could be reached in an
actual case, a threshold issue presents itself: Is the challenged action "state
action"?168 The doctrine of state action is as implicit in the text of the
ERA 169 as it is in the text of the fourteenth amendment17 0 and it was clearly
intended by Congress that the ERA have the same "state action"
requirement as the fourteenth amendment.'1
7
Assuming state action, the first question to be asked is whether a given
classification is based upon Sex I, that is, whether it distinguishes between
men and women. This inquiry ordinarily should be an easy question to
answer, since any statute using the terms "men" or "women" (except "man"
or "men"f used in a generic sense or in a context that applies equally to all
persons, as "any man or woman") does so classify; so also would any term
that has as a component of its meaning maleness or femaleness: for
example, mother, father, son, daughter, niece, or nephew.1
72
Any classification based upon a unique physical characteristic would
likewise be a classification based upon the fact of being male or female.
Differential impact upon the sexes by a classification, however, should not
in itself make a classification a Sex I classification,'7 though such a
classification might be subject to attack under other constitutional
provisions174 or federal or state law.
166. Id. Sen. Bayh would require that the state ban homosexuality or homosexual marriages by
both sexes if any homosexuality or homosexual marriages were banned,
167. The term "reasonable'relationship" is used here in its ordirnary sense and is not meant to
imply any standard of scrutiny similar to equal protection analysis.
168. The doctrine of state action arose in the context of the interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment as a result of the decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In short, the doctrino
is that the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment shield individuals from governmental actions, and
not from the hctions of private individuals. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147
(1978).
169. See note I supra: "Equality of rights shall not be denied . . . by the United States or any
State . . . (emphasis added)."
170. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides, inter alia: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which will abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . (emphasis added)."
171. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 11; HousE REPORT, supra note 43, at 7.
172. Occasionally one of these words will be used in a non-Sex I context, as, e.g., "radon
daughters." This does not destroy the general validity of this analysis.
173. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 12: "The law may operate by grouping
individuals in terms of existing characteristics or functions, but not through a vast-overclassification by
sex."
174. A classification might be without rational basis and thereby subject to attack under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Similarly, the evolutionary growth of the ERA
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Anti-discriminatory legislation forbidding discrimination on the
basis of sex would not be a classification based upon Sex I. It would not
classify on the basis of being male or female, but rather would be a
classification upon the basis of discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
conduct. Judicial remedies on the basis of such legislation would also not
be sexual classifications since they would be granted to specific individuals
for discriminatory acts committed against them. The fact that the remedy
may favor females, for example, is a result of the discriminatory conduct
itself, not the legislative classification. 175
Quotas of any sort, however, would be a Sex I classification.
Obviously any ratio of men to women, even the fifty-fifty ratio upheld by
the Marchioro court, 76 classifies on the basis of being male or female
rather than on an individual basis.
Once a Sex I classification is found, the next step in the analysis is to
determine if a Sex II element is present. As previously explained, 77 Sex II
factors are those dealing with reproduction, sexual activities, physical
characteristics unique to one sex, and those activities viewed as "sexual"
because they are traditionally done only in the presence of intimates of the
opposite sex.
If the classification has Sex II elements, further analysis is needed. If
the classification does not have Sex II elements, the inquiry is finished. The
statute making the Sex I classification should be per se unconstitutional.
This per se unconstitutionality accords well with the effects of the
ERA as envisioned by Congress; for all the classifications that fall within
this sphere would be unconstitutional, according to Congress. Women
would be subject to the military draft 78 and would be allowed to volunteer
for military service on the same basis as men. 79 In addition, exemptions
from the draft would have to be sex-neutral. 80 It does seem apparent that
women physically qualified to do so might be sent into combat, though
some ERA proponents were less than candid on this point.' 8'
might subject classifications with differential sexual impact to a more stringent scrutiny, but no such
standard was suggested in the debates.
175. Cf., e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
176. See notes 110-15 and accompanying text supra.
177. See Section IV supra.
178. SENATE REPORT, supra note43, at 13; 188 CONG. REc. 9344 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Fong);
id. at9336 (remarks of Sen. Gurney); id. at 9317 (remarks of Sen. Stennis); id.at9091 (remarks of Sen.
Ervin); id. at 8907 (remarks of Sen. Cook); id. at 8903 (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 117 Co.No. REc. 35796
(1971) (remarks of Rep. O'Neill); id. at 35788 (remarks of Rep. Abzug); id. at 35784 (remarks of Rep.
Wiggins); id. at 35325 (remarks of Rep. Harrington); id. at 35316 (remarks of Rep. Dennis); id. at 35313
(remarks of Rep. Sandman); id. at 35311 (remarks of Rep. Abzug); id. at 35307 (remarks of Rep.
Edwards); id. at 35296 (remarks of Rep. Griffiths).
179. SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13; 118 CONG. Rac. 8907 (1972) (remarks ofSen. Cook);
id. at 8903 (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 117 CONG. REc. 35309 (1971) (remarks of Rep. McClory); Id. at
35311-12 (remarks of Rep. Abzug).
180. 118 CONG. REc. 9332(1972) (remarks ofSen. Bayh); 117 CoNo. Rac. 35310(1971) (remarks
of Rep. McClory).
181. 117 CONG. REc. 35325 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Harrington); id. at 35311 (remarks of Rep.
Abzug). Contra, 118 CONG. REc. 9336 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Gurney).
The prevailing view of the influential proponents was that few women would qualify physically
EPA
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Protective labor laws applying to women only would be struck
down 82 or extended to men if they were truly beneficial. 8 3 Laws providing
special exemptions from jury duty for women would be unconstitu-
tional,8 4 as would laws imposing greater penalties for one sex than the
other for the same offense. 85 The social security system would not be able
to set different ages of retirement for men and women.1 86
It is important to note that several of the suspect statutes are, or might
be characterized as, benefits to women: lower retirement age, truly
beneficial protective labor laws, and special exemptions from jury service.
A benevolent intent toward women, however, would be irrelevant to this
analysis; a special benefit to women under the ERA would be extended to
men, or, if that were not practicable, struck down.
This per se unconstitutionality of any non-Sex II classification of men
and women is the only sure way of meeting the policy goals of the ERA,
expressed as a concern for the individual without regard for the Sex I
nature of his or her being. If the fact of sex (Sex I) is irrelevant except in
certain narrowly circumscribed areas of life, as ERA proponents believe,
then all classifications outside the areas of relevance lack any rational
foundation. This is true even if a given trait sought to be regulated is found
statistically more often in one sex than the other, for the proper
classificatory basis should be the given trait itself.' 37
When one enters the realm of Sex II, the differences between men and
women become relevant again. The state's need to regulate aspects of
sexual behavior is particularly apparent in relation to marriage and
domestic relations. The state's role in regulating the property of spouses
and its devolvement to their offspring, and its general role in allocating
civil status to its members, confer on it the power to regulate to some extent
sexual behavior, reproduction, and its physical concomitants. Recent
developments in the right of privacy have not greatly eroded that power.
Clearly Congress intended such regulation to continue under the
ERA, which does not disturb these regulations with one exception: they
must be applied equally to both sexes, that is, neither burdens nor benefits
can apply to one sex and not to the other. In other words, a Sex I
and service in combat zones would be largely at the discretion of the military services. See, e.g., 117
CONG. REC. 35307 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards): "Women in the military could be assigned to
serve wherever their skills or talents were applicable and needed, in the discretion of the
command. . . ." For similar remarks, see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13-14; Housu
REPORT, supra note 43, at 7; 118 CONG. REC. 8907 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Cook). No doubt the
proponents saw this effect of the ERA as a political liability and sought to minimize its impact,
182. 117 CONG. REc. 35320 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Heckler); id. at 35309 (remarks of Rep.
MeClory).
183. SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 15; 118 CONG. REC. 9336 (1972) (remarks of Sen,
Gurney); id. at 8903 (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 117 CONG. REc. 35307 (197 l)(rcmarks of Rep. Edwards).
184. 117 CONG. REC. 35307 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
185. SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 16; 118 CONG. REC. 9335 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Gurney); id. at 8904 (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 117 CONG. REC. 35307 (197 1) (remarks of Rep, Edwards),
186. 117 CONG. REC. 35790 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Sandman).
187. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6.
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classification with a reasonable relationship to a Sex II element is valid if it
impinges equally upon both sexes.
To apply this criteria to the consequences foreseen by Congress is to
demonstrate its soundness. For example, in the area of domestic relations,
child support would be the responsibility of both parents, rather than the
primary responsibility of the father.'88 The sexes would have equal
responsibility for alimony if circumstances warranted it."89 Grounds for
divorce would also have to be identical. 90
The ERA would eliminate the presumption that custody of the
children should be awarded to the mother after the end of a marriage.t9t
Similarly, restrictions on the property rights of married women would be
struck down, 92 and married women would be able to manage their
separate property as their husbands do. 93 Dower rights would be
equalized, 194 and the failure of the social security system to grant
survivorship benefits to widowers (as it does to widows) would be
rectified. 1
95
This second tier also makes explicable what would otherwise be
obscure. Under this implicit second standard, the power to regulate
cohabitation and premarital sexual activity is no longer "[w]ithout father,
without mother, without descent,' 196 a power without an identifiable
source. Instead, such statutes become valid Sex I classifications with a
reasonable relationship to a Sex II element, and because they impinge
equally upon the two sexes, they are valid under the ERA. 97 The same
analysis also supports what Congress denominated "the right of privacy,"
and some of the remarks made by ERA proponents indicate an analysis
similar to the one suggested that this Comment was operating sub rosa.'98
188. 118 CONG. REC. 9372 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 9331, 9523 (remarks of Sen.
Bayh); 117 CONG. REc. 35808 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan); id. at35789 (remarks ofRep. Abzug);
id. at 35325 (remarks of Rep. Reid); id. at 35309 (remarks of Rep. McClory).
189. 118 CONG. Rac. 9523 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); id. at9337 (remarks ofSen. Ervin); Id.
at 8906 (remarks of Sen. Cook); 117 CONG. REc. 35789 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Abzug); id. at 35325
(remarks of Rep. Reid).
190. 117 CONG. Rac. 35307 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
191. 118 CONG. REC. 8905 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Cook); 117 CoNo. REc. 35325 (1971)
(remarks of Rep. Reid); id. at 35307 (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
192. 117 CONG. REC. 35307 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
193. Id.
194. 118 CONG. Rc. 9523 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); id. at 8905 (remarks of Sen. Cook).
195. 118 CONG. REc. 8905 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Cook). Such failure to grant survivorship
benefits to widowers was declared unconstitutional in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
196. Cf. Hebrews 7:3.
197. This should not be taken as implying that the classification would survive other
constitutional attacks, such as an attack based upon the individual's rights of privacy.
198. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. 9531 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Cook):
What I do not understand, if the logic of the Senator from North Carolina is correct, is this.
He said if I had all of these constitutional rights up to now as a man, and a woman has not,
that I had the right to go into the lady's restroom. But as a matter of fact today ifa man goes to
a lady's restroom he gets arrested. We do not have that right.
If the theory of the Senator is correct that it is as clear as the sun in a cloudless sky with
respect to what we are talking about, it must be a rainy day, such as today, when we cannot see
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This standard would also allow the prohibition of homosexuality'
and homosexual marriages, 200 as suggested by Senator Bayh. Because the
standard requires equal impingement on the two sexes, the state must, if it
prohibits the activity by one sex, prohibit it by the other sex, just as
Senator Bayh suggested.20'
The last stage in the analysis concerns Sex I classifications with Sex II
elements with unequal impingement upon the two sexes. Such a
classification would be valid only if a unique physical characteristic were
involved, and if the Sex II element (the unique physical characteristic) bore
a reasonable relationship to the Sex I classification. Statutes valid under
this standard would include forcible rape laws, 202 regulations concerning
sperm banks, 203 and laws providing benefits for childbearing. 20 4 The nexus
between the unique physical characteristics must be close: for example, the
fact that only women can bear children would not allow the state to
provide benefits to women only for childrearing.20 :
Some of the effects ascribed to this UPC analysis do not fit the
standard offered here, but neither do they fit the explicit analysis made in
the congressional debates. As mentioned previously,20 6 Senator Bayh's
analysis of criminal statutes forbidding the use of obscene language to
female operators207 or in the presence of females, 20 8 or forbidding
209 20
seduction under promise of marriage, as well as statutory rape laws,
and the Mann Act,21' are not explicable under the criterion he himself set
forth. Certainly, all could be written in a sex-neutral way and the better
part of valor would suggest such revision if the ERA is ratified.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ERA is bottomed upon the idea that distinctions between men
and women are generally legally irrelevant. Congress intended that the
the sun. It is said I have had these rights all along and we are giving equal rights under the
Constitution which, in essence, means we have not been doing it up to now.
If I had more rights than the feminine sex, and my rights were equal with my brethren,
and equal to the rights of women, then I had the right to utilize both of these facilities, but she
only had the right to use one facility. Obviously, this is not the case.
199. 118 CONG. REC. 9331 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). The leading Senate opponent suggests
differently. Id. at 9315 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
200. Id. at 9331 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). Once again Ervin suggested this would not be the case,
Id. at 9315 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
201. Id. at 9331 (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
202. SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 16; 118 CONG. REC. 8904 (1972) (remarks of Sen, Bayh);
117 CONG. REC. 35296 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Griffiths).
203. 117 CONG. REC. 35801 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell).
204. Id. at 35797 (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
205. Id.
206. See notes 156-60 and accompanying text supra.
207. 118 CONG. REC. 9536 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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ERA could best combat sex discrimination if interpreted to preclude all
sex-based classifications with three exceptions: what Congress called "the
right of privacy," "unique physical characteristics," and "the power of the
state to regulate cohabitation and sexual activity of unmarried persons."
This Comment suggests, however, that there are problems with the
congressional schema that can be resolved with an analysis that is inherent
in the congressional debates. This analysis concerns the word "sex," which
has two separate relevant meanings: "the state of being male or female (for
purposes of this Comment, Sex I)," and "the complex of physiological,
behavioral, and cultural traits associated with genital union and
reproduction (Sex II)."
Under this analysis, Sex I classifications with no relationship to a Sex
II element are per se unconstitutional. Sex I classifications with a Sex II
element are valid only if they impinge equally upon both sexes, unless a
physical characteristic unique to one sex is involved. If a unique physical
characteristic is involved, the Sex I classification is valid if it bears a
reasonable relationship to the unique physical characteristic.
David Reid Dillon
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